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ECTOGENESIS: IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
SUBSTRATE-INDEPENDENT WOMBS? 
BRIT JANEWAY BENJAMIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ectogenesis is the gestation of a fetus independent of a woman’s 
body.1  The technology is sometimes called an “artificial womb,” “uter-
ine replicator,” or “exowomb.”2 The term “ectogenesis” was first used 
by J.B.S. Haldane in a 1923 lecture to the Heretics Society at Cambridge 
entitled “Daedalus or Science and the Future.”3 Haldane’s address pre-
dicted that by 1945, scientists would make successful use of an external 
uterus to support an embryo from conception to birth at nine months.4 
He estimated that by the year 2073, ectogenesis would be a universally 
accessed technology, with only thirty percent of new births being “of 
woman.”5 Daedalus directly inspired Aldous Huxley’s 1932 novel, 
Brave New World, perhaps the most widely-known depiction of ecto-
genesis.6 In that story, the individual’s complete subjugation to the om-
nipresent state is effectuated, in part, by the restriction of reproduction 
to state-controlled hatcheries where children are gestated in artificial 
wombs, subjected to chemical conditioning, and raised on a diet of 
brainwashing and drugs intended to cultivate obedient citizens.7 
Since the term originated, ectogenesis has been woven into 
countless works of science fiction and science fantasy, often encapsu-
lating humanity’s deepest insecurities about the locus of women’s bod-
ies in the perpetuation of our species, the source of life, and the 
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1 See infra Section II.  
2 Archuman, Ectogenesis and Exowombs: Will Sex Become Extinct?, HUMANITY+ (June 29, 
2017), https://humanityplus.wordpress.com/2017/06/29/will-sex-become-extinct/; LOIS 
MCMASTER BUJOLD, ETHAN OF ATHOS 34 (1986).  
3 J.B.S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS OR SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE (1924). 
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 63, 65. 
6 Elle Shan Wei, 1923 – Term ‘Ectogenesis’ Coined, NEXT NATURE NETWORKS (May 24, 2017), 
https://nextnature.net/magazine/story/2017/1923-term-ectogenesis-coined.   
7 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). 
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uniqueness of human labor. Lois McMaster Bujold’s 1986 novel Ethan 
of Athos depicts a colony populated by males alone.8 Their planetary 
religion holds women “to be inciters to sin, or sin [is] inherent in them, 
like juice in an orange, or sin [is] caught from them like a virus.”9 All 
children born on Athos (sex-selected males, of course), are inseminated 
in artificial wombs called “uterine replicators,” which combine the pro-
spective father’s sperm with ovarian tissue cultures brought to the planet 
by Athos’ Founding Fathers.10 To the Athosians, living women are im-
agined as little more than “uterine replicators with legs.”11 This dysto-
pian vision reflects a fear echoed by numerous feminists: without the 
leverage women obtain from their status as reproductive hosts, women 
will lose a primary source of their already limited social power.12 An-
drea Dworkin cautioned that ectogenesis will render women “biologi-
cally expendable,” “make reproduction controllable by men on a scale 
heretofore unimaginable,” and usher in an era of “absolute state control 
of the uterus.”13 Dworkin predicts a coming “gynocide,” the elimination 
of women en masse due to their reproductive obsolescence.14 Feminists 
are divided on the issue of “natural” childbirth.15 Shulamith Firestone’s 
1970 Dialectic of Sex held that until views of a woman’s choice “not to 
have children or not to have them ‘naturally’ is at least as legitimate as 
traditional childbearing, women are as good as forced into their female 
roles.”16 Firestone asserts that ectogenesis would enable equalization of 
the “natural reproductive difference” that was the origin of the first di-
vision of labor and thus “furnished the paradigm” of “discrimination 
based on biological characteristics.”17 She concludes that the introduc-
tion of the technology will be liberating for women, “unless … improp-
erly used.”18  
 
8 BUJOLD, supra note 2. 
9 BUJOLD, supra note 2. 
10 BUJOLD, supra note 2, at 10. 
11 BUJOLD, supra note 2, at 12. 
12 See ROBYN ROWLAND, CRUMBLING MOTHERHOOD: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY CREATING 
WOMEN’S PROCREATIVE ALIENATION (1987); JANICE RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S FREEDOM (1994). 
13 ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 187, 192–93 (1983). 
14 Id. at 194. 
15 See Lizzie Garret Mettler, Is “Natural Motherhood” More Feminist?, LOS ANGELES TIMES 
(Nov. 17, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mettler-natural-moth-
erhood-breastfeeding-attachment-parenting-20171117-story.html. 
16 SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 200 (1970). 
17 Id. at 9. 
18 Id. at 196 (improper use, to Firestone, includes state control of the technology and application 
to governmental aims). 
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Dystopian criticisms and fantasies betray the untested, but pre-
sumably widely held expectation that gestation bestows at least part of 
what makes humans human. Even Macbeth, all but invincible with “a 
charmed life, which must yield not/To one of woman born,” was ulti-
mately slain by Macduff who was “untimely ripp’d” from his mother’s 
body.19 Long before futurist depictions of artificial wombs, gestational 
status marked Macduff as somehow exempt from the rules governing 
other human agents. Some have held forth that the transition from vi-
viparous gestation to ectogenesis would lead to the production of off-
spring that are “nothing but psychological monsters.”20 
Much of scientific fact was once science fiction. Due to ongoing 
progress in reproductive medicine and technology, the naissance of ec-
togenesis is forthcoming. The already ample body of artistic and aca-
demic work relating to ectogenesis indicates that were ectogenesis to be 
perfected, its adoption would induce significant social change and might 
induce political crisis. In hopes of contributing to the situation of ecto-
genesis in the body of substantive due process jurisprudence, the focus 
of this manuscript will be the constitutional interests implicated by the 
invention of ectogenesis, specifically limited to the context of the Due 
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.  
This paper argues that the scope of procreative liberty is broad 
enough, as currently defined and reasoned, to encompass the use of ec-
togenetic and other reproductive biotechnologies. First, I will present 
the essential technological background details, including the present 
state of research on ectogenesis and developments relating to neonatal 
and reproductive care.21 Second, is an overview of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence regarding the liberty interest in having decisional autonomy 
regarding procreative choices and child-rearing decisions limited to the 
context of the DPC.22 Third, I apply that jurisprudence to the issue of 
ectogenesis, arguing that the current state of Fourteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence strongly suggests that ectogenesis is a fundamental procre-
ative liberty deserving of heightened protection from state interfer-
ence.23 Finally, I address potential state interests that might be raised in 
support of a ban on ectogenesis, or laws that might otherwise substan-
tially curtail an individual’s access to ectogenetic technology.24  
 
19 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 5, sc. 8, l. 2489–94.  
20 117 CONG. REC. 12744 (1971) (citing Man Into Superman: The Promise and Peril of The 
New Genetics, TIME (1971)). 
21 See infra Section II. 
22 See infra Section III. 
23 See infra Sections IV.–V.  
24 See infra Section VI. 
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Haldane’s 1923 address to the Heretics contained a poignant 
warning about the “profound emotional and ethical effect” of scientific 
advances on humanity.25 He states: 
 
“There is no great invention, from fire to flying, 
which has not been hailed as an insult to some 
god…There is hardly one which, on first being 
brought to the notice of an observer from any na-
tion which had not previously heard of their ex-
istence, would not appear to him as indecent and 
unnatural.”26  
 
In the realm of reproductive care and ectogenetic technology, moral ap-
peals to nature and stereotypes based on dystopian science fiction carry 
the risk of veering into unconstitutional denials of fundamental liberties 
for those who would rely on this technology for their safety and self-
determination.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Ectogenetic technology may be applied to multiple goals. Partial 
ectogenesis, “the growth and development of fetuses between 14 and 35 
weeks of pregnancy,” describes the preservation of premature fetal life 
via the application of technology outside of the uterus following a pre-
term birth.27 This has also been called “neonatal incubation” and is dis-
tinguished from true “ectogestation.”28 Partial ectogenesis is an accurate 
description of the life-saving measures used in neonatal intensive care 
units (NICUs) across the globe.29 These methods could be applied to 
spontaneous preterm births, as well to those early deliveries necessary 
to preserve maternal or fetal health and life.30 Full ectogenesis, “the im-
plantation and full development of fetuses in vitro,” has long been an-
ticipated but is predicated upon the development of both a functional, 
external uterus and the ancillary technologies for providing nutrients, 
 
25 HALDANE, supra note 3, at 43. 
26 HALDANE, supra note 3, at 44. 
27 Carlo Bulletti et al., The Artificial Womb, 1221 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 124, 127 (2011). 
28 Elselijn Kingma & Suki Finn, Neonatal incubator or artificial womb? Distinguishing ecto-
gestation and ectogenesis using the metaphysics of pregnancy, 34 BIOETHICS 354, 356 (2020). 
29 Bulletti et al., supra note 27.  
30 THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS COMMITTEE ON OBSTETRIC 
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oxygen, and hormones to, and removing waste from, the developing fe-
tus.31 Full ectogenesis would allow women without uteruses, or with 
uterine malformations and deformities, as well as gay men to procreate 
without the involvement of a surrogate.32 Heterosexual couples seeking 
a more egalitarian division of parental labor might also prefer full ecto-
genesis to maternal gestation. Ectogenesis might be a compelling option 
for women who wish to have genetically related children but do not wish 
to gestate, or whose professional commitments render gestation impos-
sible, difficult, or unsafe. The loss of bodily integrity that women face 
during gestation may be unacceptable to some women, who, without 
ectogenesis, face a choice between parenthood and bodily integrity.33 
Furthermore, the risks of physical gestation are non-trivial, even with 
modern obstetrics.34 Women might choose to pursue elective ectogene-
sis to avoid the risks inherent to physical gestation and delivery.35 
In 1997, Lee Silver claimed that ectogenetic technology was on 
the “more distant horizon,” and that while its development was possible, 
the development timescale is on the order of centuries, not decades.36 In 
part, Silver based this conclusion on the once true twenty-fifth week 
viability mark, noting that even when utilizing “the best neonatal tech-
nology available, we cannot push the point of viability back any further 
simply because a younger fetus cannot breathe.”37 Silver held that solv-
ing the problem of immature fetal lungs was such an “extremely diffi-
cult technical problem” and that pushing the date of viability back fur-
ther would be a very slow process.38 Per a June 2016 joint publication 
by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the 
Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine, the published data regarding 
premature newborns in the United States, England, and Australia indi-
cates a substantial improvement in the survival rates of periviable in-
fants in the past decade.39 The report reveals that the rates of “survival 
 
31 Bulletti et al., supra note 27, at 124. 
32 For a discussion of the ethics and potential conflicts emerging from procreation via surrogate, 
see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 130–37 (1994). 
33 EVIE KENDAL, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE CASE FOR STATE SPONSORED ECTOGENESIS 6 
(2015). 
34 See infra Part VII–A.1. 
35 See infra Part VII–A.1. 
36 LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING WILL 
TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 67 (1997). 
37 Id. at 66. 
38 Id. 
39 THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, SOCIETY FOR MATERNAL-
FETAL MEDICINE, OBSTETRIC CARE CONSENSUS: PERIVIABLE BIRTH 2 (2017),  
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to discharge” is 23-27% for births at twenty-three weeks, 42-59% at 
twenty-four weeks, and 67-76% at twenty-five weeks.40 For these sur-
viving periviable infants, the “incidence of moderate-to-severe neuro-
development impairment” decreases with each additional week of ges-
tation from 43% at twenty-two weeks to 24% at twenty-five weeks.41 
From Silver’s vantage point, these figures illustrate unexpected rapid 
progress in the world of obstetrics, a departure from the limitations of 
1997 where “survival [was] possible as early as 25 weeks with sophis-
ticated neonatal care.”42  
Several researchers have made progress on the development of 
bioprosthetic and synthetic uteruses.43 In 1996, Yoshinori Kuwabara, 
then-chairman of Tokyo’s Jutendo University Department of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology, had successfully developed a technique for gestating 
periviable goat fetuses in a synthetic uterus termed “extrauterine fetal 
incubation.”44 While Kuwabara’s team faced eventual “problems with 
circulatory failure” and other “technical difficulties,” they preserved the 
lives of goat fetuses for three weeks.45 Despite these difficulties, their 
successes with supplying “the fetuses with oxygenated blood while sus-
pending them in incubators that contain artificial amniotic fluid heated 
to body temperature” were widely-reported as important advances in 
embryology.46 
Dr. Hung-Ching Liu, a researcher at Cornell University’s De-
partment of Reproductive Medicine, whose ultimate goal is to develop 
a functioning “external womb,” grew a bioprosthetic uterus by “adding 
engineered endometrium tissue to a bio-engineered, extra-uterine ‘scaf-
fold.’”47 In 2003, her team successfully gestated a mouse embryo in this 
bioprosthetic uterus, almost to full term.48 Following that success, Dr. 
 
https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinical-guidance/obstetric-care-consensus/articles/2017/10/pe-
riviable-birth (providing the definition of periviable as a “delivery occurring from 20 0/7 weeks 
to 25 6/7 of gestation”). 
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 SILVER, supra note 36, at 68 (emphasis added). 
43 To avoid applying the term “artificial” to the technology, I use bioprosthetic to mean a uterus 
grown in a lab from human tissue and synthetic to mean a non-tissue uterus, made of inorganic 
materials. 




47 Soraya Chemaly, What Do Artificial Wombs Mean for Women?, REWIRE (Feb. 23, 2012), 
https://rewire.news/article/2012/02/23/what-do-artificial-wombs-mean-women/. 
48 Id. (At this time, Dr. Liu was serving as the Director of the Reproductive Endocrine Labor-
atory at the Center for Reproductive Medicine and Infertility at Cornell.) 
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Liu grew a human embryo in a similar bioengineered uterus for ten days, 
terminating the incubation prior to the fourteen-day limit placed on em-
bryological researchers.49 The fourteen-day rule emerged from a 1979 
report by the United States Ethics Advisory Board (an outgrowth of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) and was later adopted 
in at least seventeen countries, either via specific legislation or govern-
ment-commissioned scientific guidelines.50 The rule prohibits research 
on growing human embryos beyond fourteen days from fertilization.51 
In 2016, the movement to revisit the fourteen-day rule began 
gaining international momentum amongst bioethicists and researchers, 
given the advances in embryology and the potential medical value of 
research on early human development.52 In May of 2016, groups of re-
searchers at Cambridge University and Rockefeller University in New 
York announced their successful maintenance of human embryos in 
vitro for thirteen days.53 These advances, likely attributable to “[a]n im-
proved culture medium and a better substrate for embryo attachment,” 
have reopened the conversation regarding ethical limitations on embry-
ological research.54 With this research, scientists have narrowed the win-
dow of time where ex vivo gestation is impossible to the period between 
two and twenty-two weeks.55 Given the irregular rate of advancement 
in this field and the uncertain legal landscape undergirding it, it could 
be anywhere from a few years to several decades until that gap is filled.  
In April of 2017, researchers at the Children’s Hospital of Phil-
adelphia (CHOP) Research Institute published the results of their fetal 
lamb study of an innovative sealed “biobag,” which was designed to 
mimic the conditions of the uterus as much as possible.56 Their system 
enabled the extracorporeal gestation of extremely premature fetal lambs 
for four weeks “without apparent physiologic derangement or organ 
failure.”57 The researchers’ system includes a pumpless, low-resistance 
oxygenator circuit (to oxygenate the fetal blood), a closed biobag filled 
with synthetic amniotic fluid (within which the fetus was incubated), 
 
49 Id. 
50 Insoo Hyun, et al., Embryology Policy: Revisit the 14-day Rule, 533 NATURE 170 (2016). 
51 Id. at 171.  
52 Id. at 169–70. 
53 Sarah Knapton, ‘Artificial Womb’ Breakthrough Sparks Row Over How Long Human Em-
bryos Should Be Kept in Lab, THE TELEGRAPH, May 4, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sci-
ence/2016/05/04/artificial-womb-breakthrough-sparks-row-over-how-long-human-embr/. 
54 Janet Rossant, Implantation Barrier Overcome, 533 NATURE 182 (2016). 
55 Knapton, supra note 53; THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, 
SOCIETY FOR MATERNAL-FETAL MEDICINE, supra note 39. 
56 Emily Partridge et al., An extra-uterine system to physiologically support the extreme prem-
ature lamb, NATURE COMMUNICATIONS 1, 1–3 (2017). 
57 Id. at 2. 
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and an umbilical interface with the oxygenator.58 The oxygenator circuit 
is pumpless due to the risk of overloading the fragile fetal heart; the 
circuit is powered by the beating of the fetus’ heart.59 The researchers’ 
results were “superior to all previous attempts at extracorporeal support 
of the extreme premature fetus in both duration and physiologic well-
being.”60 The lambs grew up normally.61 
In October of 2019, researchers at the Dutch Eindhoven Univer-
sity of Technology were awarded a grant of 2.9 million Euros to build a 
new prototype of an artificial womb.62 The grant, awarded through the 
Horizon 2020 EU Program, enables the Dutch researchers to build on 
the successful incubation of lambs at CHOP, this time using 3D printed 
replicas of human babies monitored with sensors to test an environment 
built to more accurately model the experience of a human baby in 
utero.63 Announcements of such highly visible advances are always ac-
companied by predictable, short-lived bioethicist handwringing.64 The 
news reports rarely fail to mention the imminent Huxleyan dystopia and 
never fail to ignore the millions of infants who need improved incuba-
tion, parents who need alternatives to gestation or gestational surrogacy, 
or the role of reproductive privacy in American constitutional jurispru-
dence.65  Advances in the unsexy sub-components of these artificial 
womb prototypes likewise march forward, but without fanfare: better 
fluid filtration, tubing, substrates, and scaffolds.66   
 
58 Id. at 4, fig. 1. 
59 Id. at 2. 
60 Id. 
61 Nicola Davis, Artificial womb: Dutch researchers given €2.9m to develop prototype, THE 




64 E.g., Katarina Lee, Ectogenesis, VOICES IN BIOETHICS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://journals.li-
brary.columbia.edu/index.php/bioethics/article/view/5961 (last visited Jan. 16, 2021); Anna 
Smajdor, The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 336 
(2007); Vernellia Randall & Tshaka C. Randall, Built in Obsolescence: The Coming End to the 
Abortion Debate, SSRN (Aug. 22, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1112367.   
65 E.g., Joseph Krol, Ectogenesis: a brave new world?, VARSITY ONLINE (2017), 
https://www.varsity.co.uk/science/14017; Michael Cook, BioEdge: We must prepare for artifi-
cial wombs, say bioethicists, BIOEDGE (2020), https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/we-must-pre-
pare-for-artificial-wombs-say-bioethicists/13415 (last visited Jan 16, 2021); Paula Mejia, Fe-
tuses in Artificial Wombs: Medical Marvel or Misogynist Malpractice?, NEWSWEEK (2014), 
https://www.newsweek.com/fetuses-artificial-wombs-medical-marvel-or-misogynist-malprac-
tice-263308 (last visited Jan 16, 2021). 
66 See STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
REPRODUCTION AND ABORTION (2018). Coleman draws a distinction between research aimed 
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Whether it takes years or decades, we should be prepared to 
grapple with the right to procreate via ectogenesis whenever the per-
fected technologies arrive. Beyond ectogenesis, the same body of law 
ensuring a robust right to reproductive privacy under the Due Process 
Clause ought to protect the use of other forms of reproductive biotech-
nology. If the fundamental right to reproduce extends to ectogenesis, 
which I argue herein that it does, so does it extend to protect the indi-
vidual use of in vitro fertilization, traditional gestational surrogacy, and 
other forms of reproductive biotechnology as of yet unknown to us. 
III.     THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”67 The ple-
nary power afforded to the states is broad, and the Court will uphold a 
legislative act as long as “there is an evil at hand for correction, and that 
it might be thought that the particular legislative measure is a rational 
way to correct it.”68 This “rational basis test” is “enormously deferential 
to the government and rarely have laws been declared unconstitutional 
for failing to meet this standard of review.”69 However, when a law vi-
olates a fundamental right, the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections ac-
tivate the “strict scrutiny” standard of review that shifts the burden to 
the governmental actor to prove the law is necessary to fulfill a compel-
ling government interest.70 While not expressly enumerated in the Con-
stitution, the fundamental right to procreate, derived from the liberty 
interest set forth in the Due Process Clause, has been repeatedly af-
firmed by the Supreme Court.71 While the boundaries and limitations of 
this procreative liberty are not demarcated, the case law establishing the 
right to procreate is extensive.  
 
toward developing artificial wombs (“direct”) and incidental progress made towards their de-
velopment resulting from “research aimed at solving the problems of human infertility, and re-
search aimed at improving the survival rates of premature infants” (“indirect”). Id. He concludes 
that the “most important breakthroughs [advancing the development of full reproductive ecto-
genesis] will come from indirect research.” Id.  
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
68 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
69 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938 (4th ed. 2013). 
70 Id. at 938–39. 
71 See generally, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 
(1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925); Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 US 479 
(1965); Carey v. Population Services, Int’l., 431 US 678 (1977) (illustrating the fundamental 
right to procreative liberty is protected by the Due Process Clause).  
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In the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court overturned a 
statute prohibiting any person from teaching non-English languages to 
children who had not completed an eighth grade education.72 The peti-
tioner in Meyer was a parochial school teacher convicted for teaching a 
ten year old child the German language.73 The Court asserted that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint” but also the right “to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free” 
people, including marriage, rearing children, and acquiring useful 
knowledge.74 While this case was decided under the rational basis stand-
ard, the Court held that the prohibition on teaching non-English lan-
guages was not even reasonably related to “some purpose within the 
competency of the State to effect.”75 The Court affirmed the right of the 
teacher to teach and the parents to engage him in the instruction of their 
children, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment preserves the “power of parents to control the education of their 
own.”76   
The Meyer decision and the subsequent decision in Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters form the foundation of substantive due process jurispru-
dence and have long been cited as defining the liberty interest held by 
parents in rearing their children in accordance with their preferences and 
values.77 In Pierce, the Court overturned an Oregon law mandating, on 
criminal penalty, that all “normal” children between the ages of 8 and 
16 attend public school.78 Referring to the “doctrine” set forth in Meyer 
that parents and guardians have a liberty interest in “direct[ing] the up-
bringing and education of children under their control,” the Court over-
turned the statute as violating the Due Process Clause.79 Together, 
Meyer and Pierce provide foundational support for the parental liberty 
interest in rearing children without interference from the state.  
Nineteen years after Meyer, in 1942, the Supreme Court in Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma held that an Oklahoma statute providing for the forced 
sterilization of certain types of criminals infringed upon procreation, 
which is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race” 
 
72 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923). 
73 Id. at 397. 
74 Id. at 399. 
75 Id. at 402. 
76 Id. at 401. 
77 Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska 
to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 72 (2006). 
78 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925). 
79 Id. at 534–35. 
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and “one of the basic civil rights of man.”80 The statute at issue enumer-
ated certain crimes as warranting sterilization, such as theft, but ex-
cluded other crimes, which were “intrinsically the same quality of of-
fense,” such as embezzlement.81 Since the interest at stake, procreation, 
was found to be a “basic liberty,” the Court held that the State’s classi-
fication upon which the order to sterilize was determined (here, the type 
of crime) ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and could be justified only if the classification was nar-
rowly tailored to satisfy a compelling state interest.82 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the director of a Planned Parenthood 
clinic and a physician challenged a Connecticut state law prohibiting the 
distribution of contraceptives to married persons and the use of those 
contraceptives.83 The Court held that a “zone of privacy” is “created by 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees” and that the marital re-
lationship, including the marital bedroom and choices made therein, is 
protected by this right of privacy.84  
The Court in Carey v. Population Services International over-
turned a New York statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives, except 
by licensed pharmacists, along with other restrictions on the sale and 
advertisement of contraceptives.85 In its opinion, the Court affirmed that 
the right of privacy protects personal decisions regarding marriage, pro-
creation, child rearing and education, family relationships, and contra-
ception, from unjustified state interference.86 Referring to Griswold and 
“its progeny,” the Court held that “the Constitution protects individual 
decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the 
State” and clarified that the “decision whether or not to beget or bear a 
child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected 
choices.”87 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court held that a Massachusetts 
law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.88 It 
held that “if under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married 
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons 
would be equally impermissible.”89 Finding no rational basis upon 
 
80 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
81 Id. at 537, 541. 
82 Id. at 541. 
83 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
84 Id. at 485. 
85 Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977).  
86 Id. at 684–85. 
87 Id. at 685, 687. 
88 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971). 
89 Id. 
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which the state could distinguish between married and unmarried indi-
viduals, who were similarly situated with regards to regulating contra-
ception, the Court struck down the Massachusetts law.90 This holding 
explained that the right of privacy underpinning the protection of deci-
sional autonomy, if it “means anything…is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child.”91 
Abortion jurisprudence may also bear on the right to use ecto-
genesis, which is a matter involving both the right to procreate and the 
right to in bodily integrity implicated by the protection of the refusal to 
gestate.92 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute 
criminalizing the performance or procurement of an abortion, except 
where necessary to preserve the woman’s life, violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 The Court affirmed that the 
right to privacy includes a woman’s right to seek an abortion, but also 
stated that this right to privacy is not absolute.94 Acknowledging the 
state interests in protecting health, regulating medical standards, and 
preserving prenatal life, the Court described the co-existence of these 
interests with the woman’s right to privacy, noting that each state inter-
est “grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term, and, at a 
point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’”95 Prior to those 
state interests becoming compelling, late in the pregnancy, a physician 
and patient are entitled to effectuate abortion “free of interference by the 
State.”96 Nineteen years later in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court 
affirmed this central holding and recognized that in pregnancy, a 
woman’s “suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, 
without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however domi-
nant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.”97 
The Court replaced the trimester framework set forth in Roe and instead 
established that viability is the point at which the State may more readily 
impose upon a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.98 In a further 
 
90 Id. at 454. 
91 Id. at 453. 
92 See Julie Dalzell, The Impact of Artificial Womb Technology on Abortion Jurisprudence, 25 
WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 327 (2019) (discussing how artificial wombs and 
other reproductive biotechnology might influence the abortion jurisprudence).   
93 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
94 Id. at 155. 
95 Id. at 162–63. 
96 Id. at 163. 
97 505 U.S. 833, 845–46, 852 (1992). 
98 Id. at 876. 
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attempt to clarify the relationship between a woman’s privacy interest 
and the interests of the State, the Court held that only “where state reg-
ulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this de-
cision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.”99 This “undue burden” test, which 
prohibits a state’s creation of a “substantial obstacle to the woman’s ex-
ercise of the right to choose” has not yet been applied to assisted repro-
duction technologies like ectogenesis, but could quite logically be ap-
plied in the future.100  
In the 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck 
down a Texas law criminalizing sodomy between same-sex individuals, 
reaffirming the right to privacy relating to personal and family deci-
sions.101 The Court acknowledged that the choice in matters of sexual 
conduct “involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more trans-
cendent dimensions.”102 Noting that Griswold and Eisenstadt “were part 
of the background for the decision” in Roe, the Court in Lawrence em-
phasized the non-spatial elements of liberty, and the centrality of a per-
son’s right to “make certain fundamental decisions affecting her des-
tiny” implicit in the Due Process Clause.103 In essence, the bodily 
freedoms at issue in the referenced cases are manifestations of less vis-
ible, but no less necessary, aspects of self-determination. The Court ex-
plained that the drafters of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments “did not presume” to know “the components 
of liberty in its manifold possibilities” and declined the impossible task 
of enumerating every possible liberty that might one day be deserving 
of protection.104 In overturning the Texas anti-sodomy law, the Law-
rence Court affirmed the central holding from Casey that “our laws and 
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rear-
ing, and education.”105 It affirmed that choices regarding “these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
the compulsion of the State” and that these “most intimate and personal 
choices…central to personal dignity and autonomy” are not only within 
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, but “central” to the liberty it 
 
99 Id. at 874. 
100 Id. at 877. 
101 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). 
102 Id. at 562. 
103 Id. at 565. 
104 Id. at 578–79. 
105 Id. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
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guarantees.106 The Court unambiguously asserted that purely moral ob-
jections, even those traditionally held by a governing majority, are not 
legitimate state interests and, again citing Casey, defined the Court’s 
obligation as “to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral 
code.”107 
The Court’s reluctance to apply majoritarian morality to the in-
timate decisions of individuals is not unlimited, and it has been cautious 
about “extending constitutional protection” to newly-asserted liberties 
because doing so “place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate 
and legislative action.”108 In Washington v. Glucksberg, petitioners 
brought a challenge to a Washington statute criminalizing assisted sui-
cide on the grounds that it violated the liberty interest protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.109 In its opinion, the 
Court described its process for applying substantive due process to as-
serted liberties and defined a two-part method.110 First, it limited the ap-
plication of substantive due process to those “fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition… [and] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such 
that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.””111 
Second, it stated that proponents of an asserted substantive due process 
liberty must provide a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental 
liberty interest,” meaning that the interest must be stated with specific-
ity.112 The Court in Glucksberg further held that, in applying this two-
part method, the right to assisted suicide is “not a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause” and ultimately upheld the 
statute.113 In doing so, the Court referenced Casey and clarified that 
simply because “many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] sound in personal au-
tonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all im-
portant, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”114 
 
106 Id. 
107 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 850). 
108 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
109 Id. at 705–06. 
110 Id. at 720. 
111 Id. at 720–21 (citing Moore v. E. Clev., 431 U.S. 494, 502–03 (1977); Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). 
112 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v. 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); and Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 277–78 (1990)). 
113 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. The Court does recognize the right to die, and the right to 
refuse medical care. Id. However, they refuse to extend these rights to having a medical profes-
sional intentionally induce the death of a patient. Id. 
114 Id. at 727. 
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With regards to decisions implicating personal autonomy, the 
existing jurisprudence leaves much to be desired in terms of floors and 
ceilings. It remains to be seen how the Court’s conclusion in Glucksberg 
affects future substantive due process claims, but, even so, there is a 
clear history of protection of decisional autonomy in matters relating to 
childrearing, sex, contraception, and reproduction.115 John A. Robertson 
concluded that “one could reasonably view the Court’s decisions as hav-
ing established a broad principle of negative reproductive freedom, both 
to avoid reproduction and to engage in it without state interference” ab-
sent a sufficiently important state interest to justify an imposition on that 
negative liberty.116 Self-determination in these matters has been recog-
nized by the Court as essential to our sense of individuality and funda-
mental to American concepts of liberty.117 While even fundamental lib-
erties are not absolute, the fundamental, personhood-altering, and 
defining nature of decisions regarding marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, sexual activity, childrearing, and abortion, render them especially 
unsuitable to government interference. As illustrated above, the Court 
has held that where the liberty interest at stake falls within this realm of 
reproductive and familial choices, the state must provide a sufficiently 
important government interest to justify the intrusion on decisional au-
tonomy.118 
In the sections that follow, I argue that the decision to use ecto-
genesis is squarely within this realm of protected choices. Furthermore, 
the state interests that might be foreseeably raised in support of re-
strictions on or prohibitions of the use of ectogenesis shall not rise to 
the level that the state’s burden would require, absent the Court’s sub-
stantial departure from existing jurisprudence.119 While moral and phil-
osophical objections will undoubtedly be raised against ectogenesis, 
Lawrence makes clear that moral objections are not legitimate state in-
terests.120 That something might be repulsive or offensive to some does 
not, on its own, give the state special authority to regulate it. An attempt 
by the government to prohibit access to ectogenetic technology, or to 
place an undue burden on its use, would likely fail for want of a suffi-
ciently important state interest to justify infringement upon a liberty so 
fundamental as how to gestate one’s offspring. 
 
115 John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM J.L. & MED. 439, 
453 (2003). 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 154.  
118 See supra Part III. 
119 Robertson, supra note 115, at 455.   
120 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). 
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IV.  THE SCOPE OF PROCREATIVE LIBERTY IS BROAD ENOUGH TO 
ENCOMPASS REPRODUCTION VIA ECTOGENESIS 
Coital reproduction has been found to be a fundamental interest 
deserving of protection from state interference, absent a compelling 
government interest to justify its infringement.121 There remains a ques-
tion as to whether the use of non-coital reproductive technologies, such 
as ectogenesis or in vitro fertilization, is similarly protected and, if so, 
whether the fertility status of the individual is relevant to the level of 
protection provided by the Constitution. Whether the scope of procrea-
tive liberty is broad enough to encompass procreation via assisted re-
production technology has not been addressed directly by the Supreme 
Court.122 This is due, at least in part, to the fact that legislative efforts to 
limit access to reproductive technologies have occurred only rarely, 
which has limited the need for Supreme Court guidance.123 Robertson 
speculates that this reflects “how widespread and deep is the social un-
derstanding of the right to reproduce through sexual intercourse.”124 In 
this section, I argue that the existing bounds of procreative liberty are 
broad enough to encompass reproduction with technological assistance, 
including ectogenesis.125 Based on the reasoning underlying the deci-
sions that have solidified the recognition of a fundamental right to pro-
create, as well as persuasive reasoning from legal scholars and non-Su-
preme Court cases, one should surmise that the Supreme Court would 
overturn most instances and forms of state interference with the right to 
procreate via reproductive ectogenesis. Whether the scope of procrea-
tive liberty is broad enough to encompass ectogenesis and other repro-
ductive technologies will likely turn on the Court’s model of the inter-
ests underlying technology-assisted procreation. The outcome of that 
analysis will situate the use of reproductive technology in the procrea-
tive liberty jurisprudence and determine the level of protection its use is 
afforded. 
Robertson articulates the essence of the inquiry well. He sug-
gests that the recognition of a fundamental right to procreate via repro-
ductive technologies will depend on “the extent to which the procreative 
liberty of individuals and couples establishes the right to acquire chil-
dren non-coitally, including the right to separate and recombine the 
 
121 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that “procreation [is] funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race”). 
122 Robertson, supra note 115, at 453.   
123 ROBERTSON, supra note 32, at 36. 
124 John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the 
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942, 955 (1986). 
125 See infra Part IV. 
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various factors of reproduction as necessary to produce a child.”126 Rob-
ertson holds that the underlying interests of individuals seeking to re-
produce with technological assistance are nearly identical to the inter-
ests of individuals seeking to reproduce through traditional coital 
means.127 He states that “their desire to have a family – to beget, bear, 
and rear offspring – is as strong” and thus, should be protected to the 
same degree as those reproducing without technological assistance.128 
He asserts that if “bearing, begetting, or parenting children is protected 
as part of personal privacy or liberty, those experiences should be pro-
tected whether they are achieved coitally or non-coitally.”129 Even 
where technology “disaggregates or alters ordinary reproductive prac-
tices,” Robertson concludes, “if an important reproductive interest ex-
ists, then use of the technology should be presumptively permitted.”130  
Robertson’s views are not unanimously held. Matthew R. Ec-
cles’ exploration of whether procreative liberty encompasses the right 
to utilize reproductive technologies posits that there are three factors 
involved in “every aspect of reproduction: genetic make-up and concep-
tion, gestation and labor, and childrearing.”131 Eccles notes that the 
availability of in vitro fertilization “makes procreation possible for those 
who lack one of the necessary factors of reproduction” and that whether 
constitutional protections “extend to a couple’s use of IVF” depends on 
whether “the absence of any of those factors lessens a person’s interest 
in procreation.”132 Eccles concludes “it is the sum of those values that 
equals the whole of the natural reproductive experience” and that the 
lack of any one factor “logically lessens the significance of the repro-
ductive experience.”133 While Eccles seems to single out only technol-
ogy-assisted procreators, the logical conclusion of his line of reasoning 
is that males, who do not participate in the gestation and delivery of a 
traditionally born child, have a less significant parental experience re-
garding the resulting child and therefore should have diminished paren-
tal rights.134 Without citing scientific or sociological evidence, Eccles 
 
126 Robertson, supra note 124, at 953. 
127 ROBERTSON, supra note 32, at 39. 
128 ROBERTSON, supra note 32, at 39. 
129 ROBERTSON, supra note 32, at 39. 
130 ROBERTSON, supra note 32, at 41. 
131 Matthew R. Eccles, The Use of in Vitro Fertilization: Is There a Right to Bear or Beget a 
Child By Any Available Medical Means?, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 1033, 1041 (1985). 
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134 I could find no scientific support for this conclusion, nor could I find legal precedent sug-
gesting that the father’s non-gestating parental role should limit recognition of his constitutional 
right to parent. 
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offers bare assertions that couples using gamete donors, adoptive par-
ents, and others who become parents through non-traditional, or non-
coital means love their children less (in the case of a father raising the 
child conceived with another man’s sperm) or derive “less significant” 
meaning from parenthood.135 Therefore, Eccles concludes, “[g]overn-
ment restrictions on the use of IVF invade lesser interests and should 
require lesser justifications.”136 Undoubtedly, Eccles would argue that 
ectogenesis, which removes the gestation factor from the equation, 
should require lesser justifications for state infringement on its use. 
In the same paragraph, and in seeming contradiction with his ul-
timate assertion, Eccles states “it is the fact that a couple joins to repro-
duce their unique genes, biological traits, and social character in a child 
that makes procreation so deeply personal that it should receive utmost 
protection from governmental intrusion.”137 In the case of in vitro ferti-
lization where the rearing parents are also the gamete providers, each of 
these factors is present. In the case of the use of a gestational surrogate, 
each of these factors is present. In the case of ectogenesis, each of these 
factors is present. Eccles has not substantiated his claim that children 
conceived of in vitro fertilization have a weaker connection to their par-
ents (and thus, the parents should be entitled to lesser protection from 
government interference), but even if he had, there are countless appli-
cations of reproductive technologies that satisfy his stated criteria for 
“procreation so deeply personal” that its protection from state interfer-
ence should be strictly scrutinized.138 
To cast doubt on the Court’s possible recognition of the use of 
assisted reproduction technologies as a fundamental procreative liberty, 
Eccles argues that at the time Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional was decided, in vitro fertilization was not an available means of 
conception and “if other alternatives like artificial insemination did ex-
ist, they were not brought to the attention of the Court.”139 This state-
ment carries the implication that the Court’s decision in Carey and 
strong precedential support for procreative liberty, is somehow tem-
pered or qualified by the Court’s lack of awareness of other methods of 
conception, such as artificial insemination. If the applicability of the 
Court’s reasoning in Carey was limited to “natural” conception and pro-
creation, it did not say so. Eccles’ argument in favor of imputing the 
limitation, based on the Court’s lack of awareness of artificial 
 
135 Eccles, supra note 131, at 1042–43. 
136 Eccles, supra note 131, at 1043. 
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insemination and other reproductive technologies, is unsupportable. His 
suggestion that the Court’s decision in Carey was written blind to the 
existence of other methods of conception, including artificial insemina-
tion, is demonstrably false. While it is true that artificial insemination 
and other available reproductive technologies were not raised in argu-
ment before the Court in Carey, potentially due to the lack of relevance 
to state regulation of contraception, this fact does not suggest a lack of 
awareness of such technologies by the Court.  
Aside from centuries of documented use of artificial insemina-
tion going back to at least 1700, the Court specifically mentions artifi-
cial insemination in the 1976 decision in Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, as well as in the 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.140 In fact, in 
Roe, the Court speaks to the difficulty of reconciling traditional views 
of conception with “new embryological data that purport to indicate that 
conception is a ‘process’ over time, rather than an event, and by new 
medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the ‘morning-after’ 
pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial 
wombs.”141 Therefore, the Court’s 1977 decision in Carey affirmed the 
protection of procreative liberty with full awareness of emerging repro-
ductive technologies, and without any express limitation on the applica-
bility of its holding to “natural” procreative methods. In other words, it 
is an untenable position to suggest that the timing of the Carey decision 
suggests probable constitutional protection for only those engaging in 
“natural reproduction, not in reproduction by medical means.”142 
The Court’s probable position on whether ectogenesis is within 
the scope of fundamental procreative rights is unclear. Carl H. Coleman 
states that “[l]ike all questions about the scope of substantive due pro-
cess protections, the concept of procreative liberty is susceptible to mul-
tiple interpretations, depending on the level of generality at which the 
principle is defined.”143 Whether the use of ectogenesis and other “ARTs 
[Assisted Reproductive Technologies] should be considered part of pro-
creative liberty is as much about values and policy as it is about 
 
140 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 68 (1976); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 
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precedent.”144 In 1986, Robertson declared that “IVF [would] force elu-
cidation of the concept of reproductive responsibility, for actions done 
to create or manipulate fertilized eggs may directly hurt offspring or 
others.”145 This sentiment extends to ectogenesis, a technology on the 
near horizon of technological reality, which will force us to consider the 
reproductive nature of the human species and the ethical guidelines that 
should govern our adoption of technological tools for procreation.146  
It is necessary to discuss three sub-issues relating to the scope of 
procreative liberty and ectogenesis. The first is the right to privacy and 
whether the use of reproductive technologies, including ectogenesis, im-
plicates lesser privacy interests than traditional coital reproduction.147 
The second issue is whether the fertility status of the prospective parents 
should influence the degree to which we protect their procreative 
rights.148 The third issue is the degree of deference to parental prefer-
ence given in early pregnancy, given the right to terminate a pregnancy 
via abortion prior to fetal viability.149 As to privacy and fertility status, 
I argue that ectogenesis is functionally identical to traditional, in vivo 
gestation and ought to be given the same heightened protection under 
the doctrine of procreative liberty.150 Regarding deference to parental 
choice regarding pre-viability medical decisions, I will argue that the 
Lifchez case, while not a Supreme Court ruling, contains persuasive rea-
soning in support of the right to utilize ectogenetic technology.151 
A.  Right to Privacy 
A source of procreative liberty under the Due Process Clause is 
the due process right to privacy.152 Whether ectogenesis and other re-
productive technologies are subject to the same protections as coital pro-
creation may hinge on whether comparable privacy concerns are impli-
cated by their use.153 Eccles asserts that because procreation through in 
vitro fertilization occurs in “the openness of a laboratory,” the “proce-
dure diminishes the privacy surrounding the circumstances of concep-
tion.”154 He contends that even where “no donor or surrogate may be 
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used, the procedure involves doctors and assistants who must make vital 
decisions about an IVF birth.”155 Presumably, Eccles would apply this 
reasoning to other reproductive methods requiring medical advice and 
treatment, like ectogenesis, concluding lesser privacy interests are im-
plicated with ex vivo gestation.156 
While in the year 1900, “almost all births occurred outside a hos-
pital,” approximately 98.6 percent of all births in the United States now 
occur in hospital settings.157 Based on reports from the 46 states which 
collect data on prenatal care, only 6 percent of women begin prenatal 
care late (in the third trimester) or receive no prenatal care at all.158 This 
data does not distinguish between women conceiving coitally and via in 
vitro fertilization.159 Eccles’ premise that fewer privacy rights should be 
recognized for parents who conceive via reproductive technologies ver-
sus coitally ignores the reality that the vast majority of people utilize the 
services of doctors and other professionals in bringing forth children 
into the world.160 In a country where the receipt of medical services is 
an almost universal experience from conception through delivery, any 
attempt to distinguish coital reproduction from assisted reproduction on 
the grounds of the involvement of “doctors and assistants who must 
make vital decisions about an IVF birth” is irrational.161  
Furthermore, there are few relationships “imbued with a special 
ethos of confidentiality” to the same degree as the doctor-patient rela-
tionship.162 Ilene Moore argues that this “ethos of confidentiality derives 
from the privacy interests of the patient” and “medical information is 
often much more sensitive” than other types of private information.163 
While the legal history of physician-patient confidentiality is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the pursuit of medical advice or technology-assisted 
reproduction should not constitute a waiver or diminishment of consti-
tutionally-protected privacy interests.164 Just as within the spousal rela-
tionship, the physician-patient relationship often involves the revelation 
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of a person’s most sensitive confidences and is thus deserving of pro-
tection. Where more than 98.6 percent of mothers give birth in hospitals 
and only 6 percent forgo all forms of pre-natal care, the privacy interests 
that underlie constitutional protections of procreative liberty must ex-
tend equally to those beneficiaries of assisted-reproductive 
healthcare.165 Those who would use reproductive technologies such as 
in vitro fertilization or ectogenesis have privacy interests identical to 
those reproducing via traditional, coital means.166 Accordingly, their 
constitutional rights should be identically protected. 
B.  Fertility Status 
As to the fertility status of the plaintiff, in Children of Choice, 
John A. Robertson argues that “the principles that underlie a constitu-
tional right to reproduce would seem to apply to the infertile as well” 
and “[i]f so, they would have a negative constitutional right to use a 
wide variety of reproductive technologies to have offspring.”167  Rob-
ertson rejects the arguments of those who assert that the right to repro-
duce is only recognized where one has the “physical ability to do so.”168 
He draws an analogy to the “effect of blindness on the First Amendment 
Right to read books” noting that the “receipt of the book’s information 
is protected…the means by which the information is received does not 
itself determine the presence or absence of First Amendment rights.”169 
In the case of ectogenesis, if a woman has the right to procreate through 
traditional, in utero gestation, her right to procreate cannot rationally be 
abridged merely because the means of gestation is different.170 Ex vivo 
gestation of genetic offspring is so similar to traditional gestation that it 
should be equally protected, “with the state having the burden of show-
ing severe harm if the practice is unrestricted.”171 
Robertson acknowledges that “[t]he unique risks posed by 
noncoital reproduction may provide independent justifications for lim-
iting its use.”172 However, the fertility status of prospective parents 
should not justify differential treatment because the ultimate goals of 
the parents (reproduction and childrearing) are the same regardless of 
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the method of procreation used.173 The same reasoning applies to ecto-
genesis: a parent who wishes to gestate a child to term via ectogenesis 
and a parent wishing to gestate a child within a woman are both moti-
vated by the desire to bring a healthy child into the world.174 If procre-
ative liberty is protected on the grounds that decisions relating to 
parenthood and procreation “could not define the attributes of person-
hood were they formed under the compulsion of the State,” the choice 
of procreative method should be similarly protected for fertile and in-
fertile people alike.175  
C.  Lifchez: Deference to Parental Preference in Early Pregnancy 
In 1990, the Lifchez v. Hartigan case spoke to the application of 
the right of privacy to in vitro fertilization and chorionic villi sam-
pling.176 While Lifchez was not a Supreme Court decision, the reasoning 
in Lifchez is persuasive and ought to apply to the question of whether 
the right to procreate includes the right to utilize ectogenesis in procre-
ation.177  
Section 6(7) of the Illinois Abortion Law, at issue in Lifchez, 
prohibited “experimentation” on a human fetus unless that experimen-
tation was “therapeutic.”178 Citing Griswold, Carey, Eisenstadt, Roe, 
and others, the Lifchez court decided that since the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects a woman’s right to abort a fetus in the first trimester, it 
“must also include the right to submit to a procedure designed to give 
information about that fetus which can then lead to a decision to 
abort.”179 Further, because there can be no compelling state interest “suf-
ficient to prevent a woman from terminating her pregnancy during the 
first trimester…there can be no such interest sufficient to intrude upon 
these other protected activities during the first trimester.”180 
This reasoning is persuasive in the context of ectogenesis. If a 
woman has the right to make decisions about her pregnancy, including 
chorionic villi sampling and abortion, so should she be able to elect her 
method of gestation (a private medical decision) during that time period 
where the state’s interests in regulating pregnancy cannot defeat a 
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woman’s reproductive decisional autonomy.181 Were a woman to elect 
to utilize full ectogenesis to procreate, she would make that decision 
during the first trimester, before or immediately following conception. 
Before conception, or shortly thereafter, she would elect to gestate her 
child ex vivo. Per the analysis in Roe, where the state’s interest in pre-
serving fetal life increases as a pregnancy progresses, the state’s interest 
in the potential life contained in a fertilized ovum is dwarfed by the 
woman’s interest in determining the means of exercising her procreative 
liberty.182 Up until the point of viability, the woman’s interest in choos-
ing to gestate, or declining to gestate, supersedes the state interest in 
dictating the fate of the fetus.183 After the point of viability, the state’s 
interest in preserving fetal life may be compelling; however, the most 
likely method of preserving that life at the point of viability will be pre-
serving the gestational status quo.184 Absent evidence that ectogenesis 
will cause harm to that viable infant, to be discussed later, the state will 
be unable to articulate a reason for prohibiting the mother’s exercise of 
ex vivo gestation, especially during the gestational period prior to via-
bility.185 If the mother has the right to abort the fetus, surely she has the 
right to gestate it ex vivo.186 
V.  MEYER AND PIERCE: THE RIGHT TO REAR CHILDREN 
In this section, I propose that even if the Supreme Court did not 
ultimately recognize the use of reproductive biotechnologies as within 
the scope of procreative liberty, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the right to freely make child-rearing deci-
sions, including medical decisions during gestation.187 Such decisions 
might include the gestational format most suitable for fetal welfare, par-
ticularly where in vivo gestation would expose the fetus to the risk of 
harm. 
The right of parents to raise their children in accordance with the 
dictates of their consciences, as established by Meyer and Pierce, further 
support a Fourteenth Amendment right for parents to choose to gestate 
via ectogenesis.188 Gestation is one of the most fundamental acts of chil-
drearing. Every day, from conception to birth, the parents of the fetus 
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make decisions about how to nurture that child’s development, whether 
by nutrition or other types of prenatal care.189 This section argues that 
child-rearing begins before birth and that the choices of parents during 
gestation, particularly the choices of mothers, are subject to fundamen-
tal protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.190 
Having been unable to find a legal definition of child-rearing, I 
default to the plain meaning of the word “child-rearing.” The Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED) defines child-rearing as “the process of 
bringing up a child or children,” which is ambiguous as to the starting 
point of the rearing process.191 While the OED does not specify the point 
in time that this “process” begins, I argue that the logical beginning is 
when there is an entity (a child or proto-child) subject to the decision-
making of its parent or parents and where those parental decisions have 
a measurable impact on the health, welfare, and/or nature of existence 
of that entity.192 All parents, but especially gestating ones, make deci-
sions about the health and welfare of their child starting long before the 
child is born, arguably beginning with conception.193 Prior to viability, 
a gestating parent may choose not only how to care for the child, but 
whether to do so.194 
A large body of research supports the conclusion that maternal 
lifestyle and dietary choices have a substantial impact on a wide range 
of physical and neurological outcomes for a gestating child.195 Maternal 
supplementation with folic acid decreases the risk of neural tube defects 
by 50-70%.196 Smoking during pregnancy “increases the risk for several 
adverse birth outcomes, including infant death, preterm birth, low birth 
weight, and poor intrauterine growth.”197 The effects of “prenatal smok-
ing on child neurodevelopment may include poor language development 
and reduction in cognitive functioning.”198 Alcohol consumption by the 
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gestating mother, when “moderate-to-heavy” is “associated with neu-
rocognitive deficits across several domains, including IQ.”199 Studies 
also demonstrate “global volume reductions as well as absolute reduc-
tions in the frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes in individuals with a 
history of heavy in utero exposure” to alcohol.200  
Mothers with fetus-or-infant-impacting medical conditions, 
such as gestational diabetes or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
make decisions that can substantially influence the life-long outcomes 
for their children.201 These decisions should be characterized as child-
rearing decisions to the extent they involve behavioral modifications 
made for the purpose of influencing fetal development.202 
Gestational diabetes, defined as “glucose intolerance…first di-
agnosed during pregnancy” has been found to have “serious, long-term 
consequences for both baby and mother.”203 The transfer of maternal 
glucose but not insulin, which does not transfer to the fetus from the 
mother, “force[s] the fetus to increase its own insulin production.”204 
The impact on the fetus can be severe and may result in excessive fetal 
growth and subsequent increased risk of delivery by caesarean or harm 
to the infant during vaginal delivery, “infant respiratory distress syn-
drome, cardiomyopathy, hypoglycemia, hypomagnesaemia” and other 
post-delivery physical issues.205 Furthermore, children “born to mothers 
with gestational diabetes have nearly double the risk of developing 
childhood obesity, metabolic syndrome, or both” as well as a “life-long 
increased risk of glucose intolerance and obesity.”206 
This serious gestational complication is influenced by maternal 
choices during the pregnancy.207 While the efficacy of dietary interven-
tions for certain groups of at-risk mothers is an unsettled question, the 
“ADA recommends that women with gestational diabetes receive nutri-
tion counselling and follow a diet that adequately meets the needs of 
their pregnancy but restricts carbohydrates to 35-40% of daily 
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calories.”208 The restriction of carbohydrates to 35-40% of the maternal 
diet “decreases maternal [and fetal] glucose concentrations” thus miti-
gating harm to both mother and fetus.209 Exercise is also recommended, 
as it has been shown that “prenatal exercise can delay or prevent the 
development of gestational diabetes, and…can prevent complications to 
the baby.”210 The impact of maternal diet and exercise decisions on the 
health outcomes of the fetus and post-delivery child therefore strongly 
suggests that the process of child-rearing begins before birth.211 
The prevention of mother-to-infant transmission of HIV is a 
clear example of the impact that parental decision-making can have on 
the health and upbringing of a child during gestation.212 Globally, 90% 
of children infected with HIV contract the infection from their mothers 
in utero.213 The avenues for mother-to-child transmission of HIV include 
“during pregnancy… childbirth…or breastfeeding.”214 Without pre- and 
post-natal medical interventions, the rate of mother-to-child transmis-
sion is between 15-45%.215 This transmission rate can be brought below 
2.7% with effective intervention.216 Recommended interventions in-
clude maternal use of antiretroviral medication during pregnancy and 
delivery and a scheduled cesarean delivery.217 In addition to these, the 
post-delivery administration of antiretroviral therapies to the child to 
minimize the risk of infection, along with avoiding breastfeeding the 
infant to prevent viral transmission through breast milk.218 The decisions 
an HIV-positive mother makes during her gestation and delivery, in-
cluding treatment with antiretroviral drugs and scheduled cesarean de-
livery, can be physically invasive and interfere with the mother’s sense 
of bodily integrity.219 Yet these choices are made for the purpose of 
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influencing the child’s health and wellbeing, and thus should be pro-
tected as child-rearing decisions.220 
Gestating parents begin the process of child-rearing, decision-
making for the purpose of bringing up a healthy child, via the careful 
consideration of medical, occupational, and lifestyle choices.221 For ex-
ample, new research suggests that the use of selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (anti-depressants, such as Prozac and Zoloft) during 
the second and third trimesters of pregnancy is “associated with an in-
creased risk of [autism spectrum disorder],” even after controlling for 
maternal depression.222 In response to this finding, Susan Hyman, a “for-
mer chairperson of the American Academy of Pediatrics committee on 
autism,” recommended that “prospective mothers…have a serious dis-
cussion with their doctor about the possibility of other types of therapies 
for depression and anxiety, such as counseling.”223 Whether the finding 
of this study is supported by further research and whether the risks of 
maternal depression exceed the increased risks of autism, decisions re-
garding maternal health and welfare during pregnancy are made in light 
of possible risks to the fetus and subsequent child.224 A meta-analysis of 
twenty-nine English-language studies on maternal work and pregnancy 
outcomes found an association of “physically demanding work, pro-
longed standing, and shift and night work, with an adverse outcome of 
pregnancy.”225 Occupational exposure to “environmental chemicals” 
such as pesticides, formaldehyde, anesthetic gases, certain metals, plas-
tics, and solvents can cause serious, sometimes life-long harm to the 
fetus.226 Those in professions involving risk-inducing physical demands 
or chemical exposure, such as manufacturing, agriculture, and 
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healthcare, may choose to sacrifice career development or income to 
influence the health of their developing fetus.227 This balancing of pa-
rental welfare with child welfare is arguably the essence of parental de-
cision-making.228 
The array of maternal choices during gestation that influence fe-
tal development are too numerous to thoroughly discuss in this paper.229 
The few examples I have highlighted demonstrate that maternal deci-
sion-making during gestation can affect the child for the duration of the 
child’s life.230 This suggests that the process of child-rearing should be 
viewed as a decisional continuum beginning with conception and con-
tinuing at least until the child reaches maturity.231 The decisions made 
during pregnancy can influence child development to at least the same 
degree as post-delivery decisions about education, medical treatment, 
and religious upbringing.232 Since these gestation-concurrent decisions 
are at least as influential on the child, and the motivations for them are 
the same (promoting child-welfare), the line of cases beginning with 
Meyer and Pierce should accordingly protect those decisions made by 
parents during gestation as child-rearing decisions.233 
In summary, the decision to gestate one’s child ex vivo is com-
parable to any other decision made during gestation and should be com-
parably protected.234 A mother who is HIV-positive or who suffers from 
psychiatric conditions requiring treatment with teratogenic medication 
might choose to gestate via ectogenesis to avoid physical harm to the 
developing fetus.235 Women who work in high-risk professions might 
also elect to do the same. Parents wishing to have an egalitarian division 
of parental involvement might choose ectogenesis to preserve the equal-
ity of their contributions.236 In nearly any case, the decision to gestate 
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one’s child utilizing ectogenetic technology is as influential on the 
child’s welfare as any post-delivery parenting decision, and thus should 
be protected as a child-rearing decision under the Due Process 
Clause.237 Should the Court find that the use of ectogenesis outside the 
scope of procreative liberty, the protection of parental rights to rear their 
children provides another possible avenue for enabling the use of the 
technology.238 
VI.  UNDUE BURDEN 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court established “the un-
due burden test in an effort to balance fairly the interests between po-
tential life and a woman’s privacy.”239 This decision revised some por-
tions of the holding in Roe, clarifying that it is permissible to regulate 
the receipt of an abortion pre-viability “provided the regulation does not 
place a substantial obstacle in the path of the woman seeking an abor-
tion.”240 The Court considered each of the five provisions of the Penn-
sylvania abortion law at issue, asking whether any of the provisions im-
posed such an obstacle.241  The Court found no undue burden imposed 
by the Pennsylvania law’s medical emergencies definition, informed 
consent requirement, mandatory 24-hour waiting period, reporting re-
quirements, and parental consent provisions.242 However, finding that a 
spousal notification requirement would grant husbands a “troubling de-
gree of authority” over their wives, the Court invalidated the provision 
as imposing an undue burden on a woman’s fundamental right to seek 
an abortion.243 
Whether the undue burden test would be applied in a challenge 
to a ban on ectogenesis is unclear. In this section, the argument is made 
to apply the undue burden test to such a challenge, as it is uniquely well-
suited to balancing the possible state interests with procreative liberty. 
Should the Court encounter a challenge to a regulation of ectogenesis, 
it should consider whether the regulation places a “substantial obstacle 
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in the path” of a parent seeking to procreate.244 Accordingly, this paper 
argues that a ban on ectogenesis would pose an undue burden on the 
fundamental right to procreate for many people.245 
A. Surrogacy as an Alternative 
An opponent to the use of ectogenesis may argue that a prohibi-
tion would never place a substantial obstacle in the path of an individ-
ual’s right to procreate, given the possibility of gestational surrogacy. 
The “resort to donor gametes or surrogates is not an easy choice for 
infertile couples” and is typically only utilized where “previous attempts 
at pregnancy have failed.”246 Surrogacy can strain the marital or parent-
child relationship because “it intrudes a third party … into the usual sit-
uation of a two-party parenthood.”247 Imposing the intrusion of an un-
wanted third party into the marital and parenting relationship is arguably 
a violation of marital or parental liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause, particularly where a privacy-protecting alternative (such as ec-
togenesis) is available.248 The enforceability of surrogacy contracts var-
ies by jurisdiction, and thus, many intended parents must bear the risk 
of uncertainty that their genetic child will not be transferred to them at 
birth.249 Parents in non-enforcing states invest “considerable time, en-
ergy, and emotion in finding the [chosen] surrogate and initiating preg-
nancy in reliance on [the gestational mother’s] promise” to relinquish 
the child at birth.250 Gestational surrogacy is more expensive than tradi-
tional surrogacy (where the gestational mother is also the genetic donor) 
because the intended parents must bear the additional costs of in vitro 
fertilization.251 The uncertainty, financial exposure, and emotional strain 
render surrogacy an unviable option for many.252 
Importantly, the mere availability of alternatives does not sug-
gest that the denial of access to ectogenesis is not an undue burden on 
the right to procreate. The decision in Lawrence speaks to the likely 
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protection of ectogenesis as a matter of procreative decisional auton-
omy, even when not the only procreative method available, if one con-
siders the specific right adjudicated in that case. The Texas statute crim-
inalized sodomy, defined as sexual intercourse involving oral or anal 
copulation with a member of the same sex.253 The statute did not crimi-
nalize homosexuality generally, but rather specific methods of inter-
course between same-sex couples falling outside of traditional, hetero-
sexual penis-in-vagina sex.254 The Court’s task in Lawrence, then, was 
not to evaluate whether petitioners had the right to choose whether to 
engage in sexual activity but to choose the manner of romantic interac-
tion (heterosexual vs. homosexual) or method of sexual activity (sod-
omy vs. non-sodomy). Presumably, the petitioners in Lawrence faced 
no material barrier to engaging in heterosexual relationships or non-sod-
omitic intercourse.255 Sodomy was not the petitioners’ only physically 
available option for exercising the right to engage in sex and relation-
ships, but the option most suitable to their pursuit of self-actualization 
and personal happiness.256 The Court affirmed that decisional autonomy 
in matters regarding such intimate activities as love, sex, family, and 
reproduction was fundamental, and intrusion upon that autonomy by the 
state cannot be based on moral arguments.257 In other words, the Court 
found that denying the participants privacy regarding their choice of 
sexual partner imposed an undue burden on a fundamental liberty inter-
est.258 
The opinion did not condition the right of privacy upon sodomy 
being the only available sexual option to an individual. The decision 
was not a recognition of the right to engage in homosexual relationships 
or sodomy only in those extreme cases where no heterosexual option 
existed. Instead, the Court recognized that “[t]he State cannot demean 
[petitioners’] existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime.”259 Importantly, the Court found that a person’s 
liberty to choose the method of satisfying their fundamental human 
needs is a matter requiring the utmost protection from state intrusion.260  
The Court specifically elaborates upon other like personal decisions 
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requiring this level of protection, including procreation and childrear-
ing.261 
Since a fundamental right to procreate has been recognized, and 
repeatedly affirmed, the reasoning in Lawrence should suggest that it is 
not merely the right to procreate versus not procreate that is protected 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the right 
to choose the method or manner of procreation that enables a person to 
satisfy their most fundamental human aspirations. To protect the right 
to choose whether to procreate but not how to procreate contravenes the 
reasoning in Lawrence, for if the Court intended to carve out a specific 
exception for sodomy, it could have done so. Instead, the Court held that 
in the broad realms of family, sex, relationships, and procreation, the 
choices an individual makes regarding whether and how to accomplish 
these basic intimacies cannot be limited or controlled without a suffi-
ciently important government interest.262 In terms of elective ectogene-
sis, which is simply traditional sexual reproduction with gestation in an 
extracorporeal womb, Lawrence seems to provide protection. The fun-
damental right to procreate exists, as discussed previously, and Law-
rence suggests that the right to choose the method or manner of exercis-
ing this right can likewise not be infringed upon without the state unduly 
burdening the right itself. 
An intended parent’s decision to gestate via ectogenesis is an 
expression of fundamental decisional autonomy in matters of procrea-
tion, child-rearing, and bodily integrity. The availability of surrogacy 
does not remove the undue burden on procreative liberty that would oc-
cur from a ban on access to ex vivo gestational technologies. Therefore, 
given this undue burden, any prohibition on the use of ectogenesis 
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. 
B. Additional Circumstances Suggesting Undue Burden 
Fetal welfare, financial stability, and professional development 
are implicated in the trade-offs made by most mothers or prospective 
mothers. As of 2018, the most common occupations for women in the 
United States included janitorial/cleaning, licensed nursing, education, 
waitressing, retail, and other like positions.263 Such positions involve 
“physically demanding work, prolonged standing, and shift and night 
work,” and occupational exposure to environmental chemicals that are 
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associated with increased risk of birth defects.264 Women engaged in 
these occupations may experience a particularly undue burden from in-
fringement on the negative liberty to utilize ectogenesis because they 
are subject to the choice between a healthy child and financial stability. 
Currently more than 40 percent of American mothers are the sole or 
primary source of income for their families.265 Where those mothers are 
also employed in occupations that might undermine fetal welfare, a pro-
hibition on access to ectogenesis would amount to a substantial obstacle 
to procreation. 
A 2001 meta-analysis revealed that the wage gap between moth-
ers and non-mothers is greater than the wage gap between women and 
men.266 Childbirth imposes a substantial decrease in career development 
and earnings to women, and while the precise causes are not fully un-
derstood, it has been suggested that an important portion of this cost is 
the time expended giving birth and recovering from the physical de-
mands and complications of childbirth.267 Perceptions of pregnant moth-
ers as “receiving special treatment” or having “diminished dedication to 
… their career” may compound these material affects.268 Studies con-
clude that visibly pregnant women are perceived as “less committed to 
their jobs, less dependable, and less authoritative” which, if true, is a 
cost borne by all working women who wish to bear children.269 Ecto-
genesis would alleviate these professional costs.  
Maternal health status is another condition that might render a 
prohibition on ectogenesis an undue burden. HIV- positive women must 
often take steps to prevent the transmission of HIV to their children.270 
Ectogenesis would enable these women to instead gestate their children 
ex vivo, avoiding the chance of infection and the invasion of bodily in-
tegrity that a cesarean delivery might entail. Women at risk of other 
medical complications from pregnancy would also have access to safe 
procreation. For women whose health and safety are compromised by 
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gestation, a prohibition on ectogenesis would constitute an undue bur-
den. 
Accordingly, a prohibition on ectogenesis will place a substan-
tial obstacle in the path to procreation for many American women. Ac-
cordingly, the Court should apply strict scrutiny on any prohibition, pur-
suant to the undue burden test set forth in Casey. 
VII.  STATE INTERESTS  
Assuming the Court were to find the right to elective ectogenesis 
within the protective ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause, the state would bear the burden of establishing that its law 
burdening the exercise of procreational choice was narrowly tailored to 
satisfy a compelling government interest.271 Should the Court determine 
that the use of ectogenesis is a privacy right protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state would be unable to 
place an undue burden on the exercise of that right absent proof that the 
restriction is narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling government in-
terest.272 In this section, this paper will identify and evaluate several state 
interests that might be raised in support of the regulation or prohibition 
of ectogenesis. Whether these interests would likely rise to the level of 
compelling or legitimate, as necessary to meet the State’s burden under 
a strict scrutiny or rational basis analysis, respectively, will also be dis-
cussed. 
A.  Health and Safety 
The state’s interest in health and safety, in the context of ecto-
genesis, would likely manifest itself in the following categories: protec-
tion of maternal health; prevention of harm to children born from ecto-
genesis; and regulation of the practice of medicine. The safety of 
ectogenetic technology will be a primary state interest, and almost cer-
tain to be considered compelling by a reviewing Court.  
1.  Preservation of Maternal Health and Life 
The government might assert that its interest in protecting ma-
ternal health and safety is a compelling interest justifying restricting ac-
cess to ectogenesis. While I do not dispute that protecting maternal 
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health and safety is a compelling interest, that goal is not even rationally 
related to the prohibition of ectogenesis. 
First, certain medical ailments increase the risk of injury or death 
to the gestating mother, such as preeclampsia. Preeclampsia is a medical 
condition occurring in 6-8 percent of pregnancies in the United States 
and whose risks range from high blood pressure to seizures, kidney fail-
ure, and death.273 Since the only cure for preeclampsia is delivery of the 
fetus, although mild symptoms can be mitigated with various medical 
interventions, preterm induced delivery may be required in severe cases 
to prevent maternal and loss of fetal life.274 Ectogenesis would enable a 
mother with preeclampsia to transfer the baby from her uterus to an ex-
tracorporeal gestation chamber, which could then support the infant un-
til term.275 Without ectogenesis, particularly when the symptoms are se-
vere or the fetus is periviable, women must choose between their 
physical health and the life of their fetus.276  
Second, pregnancy involves countless risks to the health of the 
mother, which vary in seriousness depending on her age and health sta-
tus.277 Even “normal” pregnancies involve physical symptoms, impos-
ing on maternal bodily security.278 These gestational symptoms often 
include “morning sickness, dizziness, headaches, bone and muscle 
aches, loss of visual acuity, bleeding gums, breathlessness, heartburn, 
varicose veins and hemorrhoids.”279 During delivery, many women ex-
perience “vaginal tearing and psychological trauma resulting from 
childbirth itself.”280 While maternal morbidity and mortality vary geo-
graphically and by socio-economic status, “the World Health Organisa-
tion estimates that approximately [fifteen] percent of all pregnant 
women will develop a ‘potentially life-threatening complication’ as a 
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direct result of their reproductive enterprise.”281 In light of the countless 
physical risks to maternal health imposed by in vivo gestation, an at-
tempt by the state to abridge access to ectogenesis could not be ration-
ally related to the state interest of preserving maternal health. Limiting 
access to ectogenetic technologies would, at best, be neutral to maternal 
health and, at worst, impose a serious risk of physical harm to the 
mother.  
2.  Preventing Harm to Children born from Ectogenesis 
Even if procreation via ectogenesis is found to be a fundamental 
right under the Due Process Clause, the state will be able to regulate its 
use if the state can establish that children born from ectogenesis are 
likely to be harmed by the technology. It is indisputable that the safety 
of babies and children is a compelling government interest.282 If ectoge-
netic technology were shown to cause birth defects, psychological prob-
lems, or other harms to those born from the technology, the state would 
likely prevail in a challenge to a law banning its use. However, where 
no harm has been demonstrated, speculation about the harms to babies 
cannot overcome strict scrutiny.283 Speculation cannot withstand strict 
scrutiny, but the Court will defer to Congressional scientific findings 
where medical uncertainty exists.284 
The state may argue that a ban on ectogenesis satisfies a com-
pelling state interest because the human experimentation required to de-
velop the technology is harmful to the life of children born from the 
unperfected technology. In their 1985 book Making Babies: The New 
Science and Ethics of Conception, Peter Singer and Deane Wells state 
that legal and ethical limitations on human experimentation pose a bar-
rier to the testing and development of ectogenetic technologies.285 They 
argue that studies on non-human animals will be less applicable to hu-
mans (compared to in vitro fertilization experiments) because data about 
the “mental and psychological” aspects of human development, 
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essential facets of a normal human existence, cannot be understood from 
such studies.286 Commenting that “[w]ork on ectogenesis will forever 
remain unjustifiable,” given the unethical nature of attempting to gestate 
babies ex vivo who might be “brought into existence…destined for a 
deprived human life,” Singer and Wells identify one ethically-sound av-
enue for developing ectogenesis.287 As discussed in an earlier section, 
medical advances in the treatment of premature infants have led to 
steady progress towards the survival of pre-term infants born at increas-
ingly earlier weeks of development.288 With this gradual development 
of life-saving measures for premature infants, we may eventually “reach 
the point at which the human embryo produced through IVF can be kept 
alive without ever putting it inside a human body.”289 Recognizing that 
premature infants have higher rates of abnormalities “because a defec-
tive fetus is more likely to abort spontaneously or be born prematurely 
than a normal [healthy] fetus,” the authors suggest attempting to isolate 
the effects of prematurity from the effects of ectogenesis.290 By gather-
ing data about the outcomes for these children, we could determine 
whether ectogenesis is a safe technology without ever engaging in hu-
man experimentation for purely scientific purposes.291 I agree with their 
proposal for an ethical pathway toward ectogenesis. Should full ecto-
genesis emerge as a safe by-product of advances in neonatal intensive 
care, the state’s restriction of access to it could not be justified as being 
rationally related to the interest of preserving fetal life. 
Another possible scenario that might emerge is the prohibition 
on full ectogenesis prior to the clear establishment of its safety to chil-
dren born from the technology. If ectogenesis were to become available 
as reproductive biotechnology, but there existed a lack of medical con-
sensus regarding the outcomes for children born of the technology, the 
state might seek to ban its use entirely. Pursuant to the 2007 holding 
from Gonzales v. Carhart, a high level of deference would be granted 
to any scientific findings accepted by the legislature.292 
In the case of Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court upheld 
the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, which criminalized the inten-
tional performance of intact dilation and evacuation abortions (D&X), 
also known as “partial birth abortions.”293 The law provided no 
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exception for preservation of maternal health.294 Congress relied on “[a] 
select panel of physicians” who “testified about the inherent health dan-
gers and drawbacks of D&X procedures,” despite the fact that ninety-
one percent of “doctors with relevant experience in performing abor-
tions actually oppose[d] the ban.”295 Stating that the Court “has given 
state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas 
where there is medical and scientific uncertainty,” the majority articu-
lated a high standard of deference to Congressional scientific find-
ings.296 The Court thus deferred to the Congressional findings that intact 
dilation and evacuation (D&X) was “never medically necessary” and 
upheld the Act.297 
One critic of the deferential standard set forth in Gonzales stated 
that the Court’s “lower bar…for the scrutiny of scientific and medical” 
findings by Congress “invites collateral attacks” on rights “otherwise 
entitled to constitutional protection.”298 While “[j]ustice recognizes no 
congressional right to legislate away reality or the Constitution,” by 
granting broad deference to Congress-accepted science, the holding in 
Gonzales suggests that absent medical consensus, the legislature’s sci-
entific findings need not be vigorously tested.299 Regarding ectogenesis, 
this may manifest as a denial of access based on loosely supported leg-
islature-accepted science. 
3.  Regulation of the Practice of Medicine 
The state may assert an interest in regulating ectogenesis based 
on its interest in regulating the practice of medicine. The regulation of 
medicine has been described as “a particular creature of state regulation 
because it is the nexus of…traditional areas of police power regulation” 
including regulating the professions and preserving public health and 
safety.300 In Gonzalez v. Carhart, a portion of Congressional support for 
the act at issue was based in the desire to mitigate the “effects on the 
medical community and on its reputation caused by the practice of 
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partial-birth abortion.”301 Citing Glucksberg, the Court held that “[t]here 
can be no doubt the government ‘has an interest in protecting the integ-
rity and ethics of the medical profession.’”302 The legislative history of 
the 2003 Act suggested concern from Congress that failing to prohibit 
the use of intact dilation and extraction methods would “further coarsen 
society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and 
innocent human life.”303 
Ectogenesis will necessarily occur in a medically supervised 
context. The sensitive balance of nutrients, hormones, and waste re-
moval will require sophisticated medical technology and expertise to 
operate and maintain.304 The involvement of medical professionals will 
invite some state involvement, due to the police power to regulate the 
medical profession. In Gonzales, the Court considered seriously the 
state’s legitimate interest in regulating medical practices so as to pro-
mote “respect for the dignity of human life.”305 The state may introduce 
rationale for the prohibition or regulation of ectogenesis on the grounds 
that the symbolic severance of the gestational bond between mother and 
child could undermine the stability of the family unit or the value of a 
human life. It might argue that allowing physicians to engage in this 
“disaggregate[ion] or alter[ation of] ordinary reproductive practices,” 
undermines public confidence in the medical profession.306 These, and 
other arguments based on the symbolic impact of ectogenesis, could be 
held to be legitimate state interests. Should the Court find ectogenetic 
reproduction outside the scope of procreative liberty, and thus subject 
to rational basis review, the state’s legitimate interest in regulating the 
medical profession could be sufficient to justify a regulation or ban on 
ectogenesis. 
B.  Illegitimate Government Interests  
Interests that would be deemed illegitimate include arguments 
based on moral or religious dogma and, under strict scrutiny, arguments 
that are speculative in nature. 
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The Lawrence Court held that arguments based on purely moral 
assertions are not even legitimate state interests.307 Moral or religious 
arguments against the use of ectogenesis could include that the technol-
ogy is an offense against G-d or against nature and that a woman utiliz-
ing ectogenesis “would be shirking her obligations as a mother and 
denying her essential identity as a woman.”308 Whether the Court char-
acterizes ectogenesis as a fundamental procreative liberty or not, such 
moral arguments are not even legitimate state interests and cannot be 
used to justify a ban under any standard of review. 
If reproduction via ectogenesis is protected as a fundamental 
procreative liberty or privacy interest under the Due Process Clause, 
many of the arguments made in opposition to it must fail as too specu-
lative. As previously discussed, strict scrutiny requires the state to prove 
that the law is narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling government in-
terest.309 Speculative harms are insufficient.310 Some of the many highly-
speculative arguments against ectogenesis include that ectogenesis will 
lead to the mass extermination of women, that it will be used to farm 
human organs or to grow slaves, that it will destroy traditional family 
structures, and that children born from ectogenesis will be “nothing 
more than psychological monsters.”311 Each of these concerns evokes a 
salient image of dystopia and each reflects the presumably widely-held 
intuition that the mother-child gestational bond serves an important so-
cietal function. However, since speculative harms cannot justify the de-
nial of a fundamental liberty, under strict scrutiny, a prohibition of ec-
togenesis on these grounds would fail.312 Under rational basis review, 
speculative harms can satisfy the requirement of a legitimate state inter-
est rationally related to the law in question.313 If reproduction via ecto-
genesis is not within the scope of fundamental procreative liberty or 
child-rearing, some or all of these hypothetical dystopian visions could 
be raised in support of its regulation.  
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VIII.   CONCLUSION  
Ectogenesis exists on the reproductive frontier. As technological 
advances in neonatal intensive care occur, the emergence of new meth-
ods of reproduction will present novel legal challenges for lawmakers 
and the Supreme Court. As argued above, the right to use ectogenesis to 
reproduce involves the rights to procreate,314 not to gestate,315 and to 
make child-rearing decisions autonomously without state interfer-
ence.316 If the right to utilize this technology is found to be fundamental, 
which would be logical given the existing reproductive privacy juris-
prudence, the Court will approach from a baseline of strict scrutiny, pro-
hibiting the state from unduly burdening access absent a compelling 
state interest. Whereas if the use of ectogenesis does not fall within the 
scope of the Due Process Clause, any restriction that is rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest will suffice. 
The state of substantive due process jurisprudence regarding 
procreative liberty and reproductive biotechnologies leaves enough un-
charted territory to make predictions futile. In any case, we must refrain 
from proclaiming ectogenesis “indecent and unnatural,” 317 given the po-
tential gains to humanity, especially for us gestating humans, from its 
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